There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it's becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distinguishes the process in which the phenomenal quality is formed from the process that makes this quality conscious. We put forward a conceptual, methodological, neuropsychological and neural argument for the dual model. These arguments are independent but provide mutual support to each other. Together, they strongly support the dual model of phenomenal consciousness and the concomitant idea of unconscious mental qualities. The dual view is thus, we submit, a hypothesis worthy of further probing and development.
Introduction
There is almost unanimous consensus in the literature regarding consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state exists exclusively in its conscious form (see, e.g., Revonsuo, 2010, 39 and 72, Crick & Koch, 2003; Koch, 2004, 242 and 300, ffytche, 2000; Prinz, 2012) . Pains, sounds and colours -phenomenal qualities constituting the phenomenal character of a mental state -can only occur at the level of consciousness. Sophisticated neural processing accompanies these mental states but this processing entirely lacks phenomenal character. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. The unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal character, and its becoming conscious, to be one and the same thing. Most theories of consciousness advocated in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience of consciousness are unitary. The dual model, which we describe and defend in this paper, distinguishes the process in which the phenomenal quality is formed from the process that makes this quality become conscious. The dual model agrees with the unitary model in that conscious phenomenal states possess the experiential what-it's-like-ness and that unconscious mental states lack it. However, it allows that unconscious mental states possess phenomenal character (or phenomenality, as Ned Block calls it; see Block, 2001 ). On this view, the experiential what-it's-like-ness is simply a result of the combination of phenomenal character and consciousness.
It is important to realize that the widely held identification of the experiential what-it's-like-ness with phenomenal character, and the ensuing denial of unconscious phenomenality, is not a result of evidence-based argument. Rather, the notion of unconscious phenomenal quality seems to be a contradictio in adjecto because phenomenality seems to be conceptually linked with consciousness. We propose to sever this alleged conceptual link. The stubborn intuition that only conscious mental states can harbor phenomenal character is probably based on the fact that we come to know the phenomenal character of mental states from the instances of conscious perception and other kinds of conscious mental processes. But that does not necessarily imply that phenomenal character 1894, 352). Rosenthal breaks free of this tradition. He suggests that consciousness is something that phenomenal states can but need not have. Rosenthal (1986) illustrates the distinction between conscious and unconscious pain in the following way. Suppose we are in pain for a longer period of time, say the whole day. Although we are not conscious of the pain for all this time, being often distracted by other things, it is perfectly natural to say that we have been in pain the whole day. By the same token, someone may limp while Fig. 1 . The dual model of phenomenal consciousness distinguishes the process in which the phenomenal character of a mental state is formed from the process that makes this character conscious. Thus the phenomenal character can occur unconsciously and the what-it's-like-ness of a mental state is the phenomenal character as experienced consciously by a subject.
T. Marvan, M. Polák Consciousness and Cognition 56 (2017) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] walking without being conscious of the mild pain in the leg (Rosenthal, 2011, 435n8) . 1 It seems odd to say that the pain was there only in those intervals when we registered it consciously. Yet this is precisely what the aforementioned philosophical tradition demands. The tradition dictates that the pain ceases to exist the moment we stop being aware of it, although the same bodily processes presumably continue to operate all along. Rosenthal prefers to say that the pain, including its phenomenal quality, can become temporarily unconscious. At the very least, he points out, there are no independent reasons for preferring the traditional story to the one that allows for unconscious phenomenality. Rosenthal also submits that instances of subliminal perception (Kihlstrom, 1987; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2000) prove his point regarding unconscious sensory qualities (Rosenthal, 2011, 433) . When a perception is subliminal, the subject is phenomenally unaware of the percept, but the phenomenal quality persists and is registered unconsciously. At least this is one way to take it, and it is not obviously less plausible when compared to the standard story, which denies all unconscious phenomenality. The Rosenthalian conceptual argument thus states that it is no more unnatural or unfounded to speak about unconscious pains and other phenomenal states, than it is to hold that phenomenal qualities are necessarily tied with consciousness. It is questionbegging to hold that phenomenal qualities must be conscious -an artifact of the deeply entrenched view that it makes no sense to speak about phenomenal states apart from their conscious presentations. Although the qualitative nature of a mental state can be directly ascertained only from its conscious appearance to a subject, consciousness is not constitutive of it. However, it is natural to worry that because consciousness provides access to the quality's intrinsic nature, phenomenal qualities are simply consciousnessmaking qualities; the idea of unconscious phenomenal states might then strike many theorists as incoherent. There is thus a pressing need to provide consciousness-independent criteria of identity for perceptual phenomenal qualities.
Quality-Space Theory (QST; Clark, 2000; Rosenthal, 2010, ch. 1 ) is meant to do precisely this. It fixes perceptual qualities by their perceptual roles. Perceptual states enable us to distinguish between various properties of perceptible objects because they track these properties by means of the qualitative features they have. There is thus a matching between the quality space of mental qualities (in a specified sensory modality) and the space of perceptible properties of objects. Perceptual properties of objects are commonsense properties such as shape, colour, position or movement of physical things in our surroundings. If we are able to make a perceptual discrimination between two such perceptible properties, say between two shades of the same colour, that means there is a difference between mental qualities corresponding to these properties. However, the matching of perceptual properties and mental qualities is not a matching of any qualitative likeness between the two. Rather, what is analogous are the relations of similarity and difference between the members of both these groups. Perceptible properties of objects are similar and different in certain respects, and mental qualities in a given sensory modality display the same relational ordering. If this were not the case, we couldn't use the mental qualities to successfully track the perceptible features of external objects and accurately differentiate between them. To give an example, perceptible red colour of an external physical object is more similar to perceptible orange than to perceptible violet. The same set of relations of similarity and difference then holds between the corresponding mental qualities as well: the mental quality of red is more similar to the mental quality of orange than to the mental quality of violet. Both quality spaces are in this sense homomorphic (see Rosenthal 2005b, Section 4, for more details).
Perceptual states enable perceptual discriminations independently of being conscious: there are various methods of constructing a quality space of, say, colours, which do not depend on conscious awareness of perceptual qualities. Unconscious priming and forcedchoice discrimination in absence of conscious perception are prominent among these. These empirical methods enable us to determine the relations of relative discriminability and similarity amongst the qualities, and to construct a systematic quality space reflecting these relations. QST complements the first person access to perceptual qualities by empirically fixing their relative positions in a quality space without relying on their conscious appearance. The first person conscious access is thus not the only mode of access to perceptual qualities, although other modes of access are only indirect, via observable behaviour of the tested subject, neurophysiological activity measured by imaging methods and other physiological measures such as changes in skin conductance. Again, even though QST is compatible with the HOT theory of consciousness, it is dissociable from it. There are other ways to account for how mental states become conscious (we offer a distinctly neural explanation in Section 3.2 below).
Why is QST supporting the idea of unconscious phenomenal qualities? Because perceptual discrimination of stimuli is performed by means of discriminating the phenomenal features, both at conscious and unconscious level.
2 When a subject indicates she can distinguish two perceptual qualities, she distinguishes them by their phenomenal appearance. And because the same perceptual discriminations within a given quality space can be performed both consciously and unconsciously, we have a reason to believe that both types of discriminations are performed with the help of the same phenomenal qualities. If, on the contrary, conscious and unconscious perceptual discriminations (and thus quality spaces) would differ, one could assume that either there are no unconscious qualities or perhaps that unconscious qualities are in their nature different from the conscious ones. We know of no empirical work in psychophysics proving that conscious and unconscious quality spaces differ. By contrast with this parsimonious explanation of how perceptual discrimination is performed, unitary theories, committed to denying unconscious phenomenal states altogether, must hold that albeit the resulting perceptual discriminations are identical, unconscious discriminations are performed in a completely different way, with the help of a completely different set of mechanisms than the conscious ones. This is a logical consequence of the fact that according to the unitary model, no phenomenality is involved in unconscious perceptual discrimination. Unfortunately, unitary theories leave those alternative mechanisms unspecified.
1 Neuman (2004) reports a similar case in which the patient's face during surgery had an expression of pain though the patient was under local anesthesia, claimed to have no subjective awareness of pain and was genuinely surprised by the surgeon's question "Do you feel any pain?" 2 A parallel argument can be run for perceptual recognition of object properties via phenomenal features. We show this in Section 3.1.
T. Marvan, M. Polák Consciousness and Cognition 56 (2017) 1-12 Rosenthal's example of unconscious pain opens up the possibility of conceptually separating mental state itself, including its phenomenal character, from its conscious appearance to the subject. But the debate about unconscious phenomenality need not be resolved by conceptual intuitions alone. If that were the case, we could probably never reach a resolution of the issue. Fortunately, there are other arguments in favour of separating the phenomenal character of a mental state from its becoming conscious. We will develop them in the following sections of this paper.
Methodological argument
We are well aware that the idea of unconscious phenomenality is counterintuitive. The popularity of the idea of unconscious phenomenal states among theorists of consciousness is thus negligible. Apart from Rosenthal and some of his collaborators (see Young, Keller, & Rosenthal, 2014) , to our best knowledge the only philosopher advocating unconscious qualitative states is Coleman (unpublished results). 3 He argues that whereas phenomenal character of mental states differs from case to case, the way in which these states are conscious is always the same. Therefore, it seems plausible to treat the phenomenality and the consciousness of a mental state as two separate things. Coleman also claims, in a similar vein to Rosenthal, that there are no arguments for the necessity of conscious nature of phenomenal qualities; there is just the stubborn intuition that they must be conscious.
4
To further enhance the attractiveness of the idea of unconscious phenomenality, we propose the following methodological argument in its favour. In order for consciousness to be amenable to scientific exploration, it needs to be treated as an experimental variable (Baars, 1997 (Baars, , 2003 . This is a standard methodological desideratum in all areas of scientific research. Applied to the case of phenomenal consciousness: we need to empirically study pairs of mental states that are alike in all respects except that one is conscious and the other not. Only then will consciousness be treated purely as a variable. This, though, is not how the aforementioned philosophical tradition conceives of the matter. According to the tradition, conscious and unconscious mental states are quite different. The conscious states have phenomenal character while the unconscious don't. Yet if unconscious states lack phenomenal character, their consciousness is not an experimental variable. Rather, we are dealing with mental states being conscious and having phenomenal character on the one hand, and states lacking both consciousness and phenomenal character on the other. If this were the case, the possibility of a truly scientific study of consciousness would be endangered.
Embracing the notion of unconscious phenomenality removes this obstacle to the scientific study of consciousness. The dual model of phenomenal consciousness allows one to say that conscious and unconscious mental states share their phenomenal character. Supposing this phenomenal character to be fixed independently of consciousness, we can then launch an empirical research into how a mental state becomes conscious during perceptual and other processes. The study of how a state acquires its phenomenal character should target other, though probably closely related, brain mechanisms.
5
We should like to stress again that according to the dual model, conscious and unconscious states may share the same phenomenal character. We do not wish to claim that unconscious phenomenal states possess some mysterious "phenomenality" of a hitherto unknown kind (such as, for instance, the phenomenality of electrons posited by some panpsychists -see Goff, 2016) . The consciously perceived shape, colour and other properties are phenomenal qualities and the same qualities can be realized in the brain even without consciousness. Conceived this way, the methodological desideratum of empirical research into consciousness is met. We can treat consciousness of a mental state as a variable that some states exhibit and some other states, possessing the same phenomenality, lack. 6 3. Conscious and unconscious phenomenal qualities (II): Arguments from neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience
Neuropsychology
Important empirical support for a dissociation of consciousness and phenomenal character is furnished by a visual dysfunction called hemispatial neglect (henceforward "neglect"; see Vallar & Perani, 1986) . Neglect results most frequently from stroke in the inferior parietal lobe (particularly in the region of the temporo-parietal junction), but it can also follow damage to other parts of brain both in the cortex (the inferior frontal cortex and the superior temporal gyrus) and in subcortical areas (the basal ganglia and the thalamus) (Arend, Rafal, & Ward, 2008; Husain & Rorden, 2003) . A person suffering from this disorder cannot see objects in the left half of her visual field. For example, if a patient with neglect draws a clock hanging on the wall, a house or a cat, the result is that almost the entire left half of the image is absent. The spectrum of behavioural disorders stemming from this type of neglect is broad: patients bump into the left side of the door, do not eat food on the left side of the plate, do not register when someone is approaching 3 The neuroscientist Damasio (1999) also hints at unconscious phenomenal states in his talk of "unconscious images". 4 Referee suggests it is possible to hold that phenomenal consciousness is a determinable of which particular conscious qualitative states are determinates. On this picture, mental qualities cannot become unconscious. This way of looking at things presupposes the unitary view of consciousness, and in this respect begs the question against the dual model. Still, it has the merit of showing that there might be unitary conceptions of consciousness that do not merely rely on an unsupported intuition that phenomenal qualities must necessarily be conscious. 5 We will say more about the possible neural underpinning of the dual model of phenomenal consciousness in Section 3.2 below. 6 According to some contemporary theorists, cognitive mental states such as thoughts or judgements lack all distinctive phenomenality (see, for instance, Carruthers, 2010) . So one might object that the methodological argument of this section does not target such conceived states, because they are intrinsically the same in both conscious and unconscious form. We grant that if thoughts lack phenomenality, their consciousness can be treated as a variable and the methodological desideratum is satisfied. However, here we focus on perceptual states and these have phenomenality on virtually every account. Moreover, we favour the conception of Prinz (2012) according to which even cognitive mental states possess phenomenal character; in the case of verbalized thoughts, the phenomenology is that of the subvocal speech.
T. Marvan, M. Polák Consciousness and Cognition 56 (2017) 1-12 from the left, and the like. For our purposes, the most intriguing thing about neglect is the fact that the absence of conscious phenomenal information in the left part of the visual field does not preclude the brain unconsciously processing the stimuli from this area. Take perhaps the most famous example of neglect, an experiment involving pictures of two houses that were shown to a person affected by this visual disorder (Marshall & Halligan, 1988) . The first picture displayed a house with two windows and a chimney, all in green contours. In the second picture the same house was drawn, but the left half of it, the one that corresponded to the area of the visual field in which the person did not consciously see anything, was in red contoured flames. The subject was asked two questions: what she saw in the pictures and whether she could see any difference between them. After answering that she saw houses and that the two pictures were the same, the task was to choose from the two houses the one in which she would prefer to live. After initial embarrassment the subject chose one or the other. Although she did not see a burning house, as is evident from the answer to the previous questions, in repeated trials she selected in about 80% of cases the house without flames. Thus, the flames were somehow registered by the subject, albeit not consciously.
In our view, the burning house was perceived unconsciously in the following way: the phenomenal image of the house was formed, but it was not made conscious. This unconscious phenomenal image of the flames engulfing the second house then guided the subject's choice of the house she would prefer to live in. We thus believe that in order to account for such a significant behavioural effect, it is plausible to assume that the brain works with unconscious phenomenal information that tips the subject off to the obvious choice of the house. Therefore, we take the results of the burning house experiment as providing further empirical support for the distinction between phenomenal qualities and their conscious awareness. The Quality-Space Theory mentioned in Section 2.1. stresses that unconscious discrimination of stimuli relies on the same qualitative features as are perceived consciously. Here, the same idea is in play, only the subject is engaged in unconscious recognition of a stimulus (i.e., in unconscious recognition of the shape of the flames engulfing the second house).
Some authors debate whether the case of the burning house experiment confirms that patients identified unconsciously the relevant meaning of neglected stimuli ("It's a burning house!"), or were only able to process the purely perceptual information such as the shape of the depicted flames (see Bisiach & Rusconi, 1990; Vallar, Rusconi, & Bisiach, 1994) . The level of processing of the consciously unperceived visual stimuli has been studied for instance by Berti and Rizzolatti (1992) in a study on a single patient. The patient, affected by left visual field extinction (a type of neglect in which the presence of the stimulus in the ipsilateral hemifield prevents the patient from seeing the stimulus in the contralateral hemifield), was able to identify and name consciously unperceived objects depicted in the photograph. As further shown by Berti (2002) , unconscious processing of perceptual stimuli can be very comprehensive. But even if we assume that in the Marshall and Halligan experiment, only the purely perceptual information about the depicted house was processed, it is still completely consistent with the idea that phenomenal character was perceived unconsciously and guided the subsequent behaviour of the patient.
According to one influential view, neglect is strictly speaking not a visual dysfunction but rather a kind of attentional dysfunction (see, e.g., Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2014, 278) . Clearly, this view in no way clashes with the dual model of phenomenal consciousness. The so called ventral stream (Goodale & Milner, 1992) where the unconscious phenomenal qualities are presumably formed remains intact in neglect patients. Attentional dysfunction in the parietal areas then blocks these qualities from becoming conscious. The case of blindsight, another neuropsychological disorder frequently used as an example of unconscious perception, is not that straightforward, though. Blindsight is typically caused by lesion to the striate cortex (V1). Due to the lesion, patients cannot consciously see objects in part of their visual field (scotoma). Despite the impairment of the visual cortex they often perform remarkably well within a forced-choice paradigm, discriminating simple stimuli such as the location of the object, its space orientation, direction of movement, or wavelength (Cowey, 2010; Sahraie, Hibbard, Trevethan, Ritchie, & Wieskrantz, 2010) .
Suppose that V1 is necessary (though not sufficient) for phenomenal character to be formed. Then, due to lesioned V1, blindsight patients will not be able to register visual phenomenal qualities, not even unconsciously. Neurophysiological research, however, indicates that there are alternative neural routes from the retina to various regions of the visual brain; e.g., some routes lead through the LGN and superior colliculus, bypass V1 and reach extrastriate regions such as V2, V4, V5 (Cowey, 2010; Pöppel, Held, & Frost, 1973; Weiskrantz, 1996) . This finding convinced some authors that in blindsight, some residual visual information enters the extrastriate visual regions, and is processed there even without the contribution of V1 (Overgaard, 2012, 609; Weiskrantz, 1986 Weiskrantz, , 1996 . Is it possible that these extrastriate regions are able to process unconscious phenomenal character of visual percepts, despite the impaired connection between the retina, V1 and extrastriate visual regions? We submit that this is an intriguing hypothesis, which sits well with the dual construal of phenomenal consciousness. Similarly as in the case of neglect, the above chance correct visual discriminations of a blindsight subject entitles one to infer that unconscious phenomenal character has been constituted and tacitly used as a guidance in the discriminatory task at hand.
Still, some researchers believe that blindsight is a highly controversial example of unconscious perception. A hotly debated issue, for example, is whether the patients' visual perception during blindsight is totally unconscious (Brogaard, 2011; Weiskrantz, 2009) , or whether it is conscious, though qualitatively degraded and transformed in its own way (Overgaard, Fehl, Mouridsen, & Cleeremans, 2008; Overgaard & Grünbaum, 2011; Phillips, 2016) . Particularly extended and deep criticism can be found in Campion, Latto, and Smith (1983) , where the view of blindsight as phenomenally unconscious seeing was challenged. They claim that all blindsight subjects are aware of stimuli at least to some extent. Conscious vision in blindsight could depend on islands of spared V1 or on how the light from the "unseen" stimulus might be detected in the portion of the visual field unaffected by the scotoma. Its presence may be obscured by the fact that blindsight patients use different response criteria during signal detection in the blind and in the seeing field. Particularly in the yes/no task, it's possible that the response depends not only on sensitivity to the target, but also on a tendency to select the conservative response "No" when subject's reasons for saying "Yes" are not absolutely persuasive (this is the so called ʻconservative response bias'). If this criticism is correct, all blindsight subjects see the stimuli consciously, and this is so however limited, degraded, or distorted their conscious seeing is (see also Phillips, 2016) .
However, without a clearly defined criterion for distinguishing conscious from unconscious visual perception, the debate cannot be resolved. The often used dichotomic "Seen-Not seen" scale may be too crude to eliminate the conservative response bias. But when more nuanced subjective measures of consciousness are applied, this danger can be averted. Perceptual awareness scale (PAS; Sandberg & Overgaard, 2015; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010 ) is such a measure. Its four-point scale -(1) 'No experience', (2) 'Brief glimpse', (3) 'Almost clear image', and (4) 'Absolutely clear image' is quite sensitive to all sorts of experiences the subject might undergo and it was built with the input from the experimental subjects. When PAS is used, some stimuli classified as unseen on a dichotomous scale are classified as somewhat consciously apprehended (point 2 of the perceptual awareness scale). The effect of having more categories of experience on a scale instead of just two is that the responses are more precise and the risk of conservative response bias is minimized. PAS is very sensitive particularly for low stimulus intensities and it has stronger performance-awareness correlation than objective measures such as confidence ratings or post-decision wagering (Sandberg et al., 2010) . The introduction of the PAS, though, does not eliminate unconscious perception. As Mazzi, Bagattini, and Savazzi (2016) reports, when PAS was applied on a patient with completely destroyed and dysfunctional left part of V1, only the values of 1 (No experience) and 2 (Brief glimpse) on a perceptual scale were selected, while performance remained at above chance levels.
7 Thus, blindsight cannot be excluded as a form of unconscious visual perception and may be legitimately used in favour of the dual model of phenomenal consciousness, until a decisive argument to the contrary is put forward. Cases of unconscious visual perception in which healthy subjects are tested could, in a similar vein, be used in support of the dual model of phenomenal consciousness. We have in mind the various experimentally studied forms of subliminal perception (for a review, see Breitmeyer, 2015) . These could be divided into experimental paradigms in which the time to perceive a stimulus is shorter than the conscious threshold, e.g., in classical visual masking, and into experiments like continuous flash suppression or binocular rivalry where the time frame is much longer. In both groups, the above chance correct discriminatory reactions of subjects can be used to infer the presence of unconscious phenomenal qualities. Although unconscious perception in healthy subjects is considered as a well proven phenomenon (see Dehaene, 2014; Prinz, 2017) , some researchers recently raised doubts about it. For instance, Peters and Lau (2015) deny the reality of forward-and backward-masked unconscious perception. Using their bias-free experimental design, they conclude that discriminatory success goes hand in hand with conscious awareness, and claim there is no compelling evidence for unconscious perception. The thresholds for subjective awareness and objective discrimination of stimuli are, according to them, effectively the same. They claim that unconscious perception doesn't occur in people without brain damage (see also Block & Phillips, 2016) .
Peters and Lau concentrate on masking experiments involving healthy subjects. By focusing on brain-damaged subjects with neglect or blindsight, we can largely steer clear of this so far unresolved issue. 8 It is possible that the sceptical conclusions of Peters and Lau are due to limitations of the experimental procedures applied in experiments with healthy subjects. Perhaps the masking methods they rely on are not sufficient to completely eliminate conscious perception. An advantage of pathological cases is that there is a precisely localised destruction of brain tissue. Knowing that a certain visual area is dysfunctional allows us to rule out any processing of the visual information in this part of the brain. The risk of conservative response bias in these cases is correspondingly reduced: because the subject can form no percepts in the damaged area, conservative response bias can hardly arise in these cases. And if any suspicion remains that conservative response bias is in place, due perhaps to residual detection of stimuli in undamaged areas of visual cortex, we can minimize it by applying the PAS method described above. We would, of course, welcome the extension of our argument for unconscious phenomenality from experiments with neuropsychological patients to experiments with healthy subjects. There is some hope that this could be done. Ro, Singhal, and Garcia (2009) point out that perceptual experiments on healthy and neurological subjects provide converging evidence that processing of shapes and other features occurs in the absence of awareness. Still, how smoothly the findings from neuropsychological deficits generalize to neurologically healthy humans remains an open and somewhat controversial issue. Apart from the scepticism of Peters and Lau, some experimenters suggest that visual processing in blindsight patients works differently than in healthy subjects, possibly due to neuroplasticity (Railo, Andersson, Kaasinen, Laine, & Koivisto, 2014; Tamietto et al., 2010) . Therefore the safer option (for now) seems to be to treat neuropsychological perception and ordinary perception separately. Both can support the dual model of consciousness in their own right, especially if the current controversies are resolved in favour of the unconscious perception in healthy subjects. Now, the thesis that conscious and unconscious states share the same phenomenal qualities might be deemed too strong. It might be necessary to modify it in light of recent empirical findings. Moreover, some of these findings suggest that some phenomenal qualities cannot occur without consciousness. Take, for example, the research of Moutoussis and Zeki (2002) . These authors used the dichoptic masking paradigm to study unconscious face perception. First, they exposed subjects to two coloured drawings of faces 7 The Brief glimpse (option 2 on the scale) simply means "I feel that something has been shown, but I have no idea what it was." The subject is not aware of any specific details of the stimulus (its colour, shape and so on). It is plausible to assume that successful performance is driven by unconscious processes when option 2 is selected.
8 Admittedly, some arguments in Phillips (2016) do target perception in neglect and blindsight. We are not persuaded by Phillips' reasoning, but we do not want to go into details in this paper. 9 Peters and Lau acknowledge that subliminal priming methods are not affected by their arguments against unconscious perception. Their criticisms target forcedchoice discrimination paradigm (Peters & Lau., 2015, 10) . The results of the priming experiments, such as the ones we use to support the dual model in the following paragraphs, are thus unaffected by current controversies about unconscious perception.
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framed in a square form. One eye was presented with a drawing of a red face with green hair and green face contours, the other with the colour-opposite drawing, that being a picture of a green face with red hair and red face contours. The resulting conscious visual percept was that of a yellow square with no face consciously visible. Subsequently, they exposed both eyes with a same-coloured face (red face, green hair and green contours). This led to conscious visual percept of the face. A comparison between the opposite-colour stimulation with the same-colour stimulation exposed that the brain regions activated were much the same in both cases. However, the opposite stimulation led to a weaker activation and a less extensive neural pattern in the fusiform area. Suppose that the unconscious phenomenal character posited by the dual model of consciousness exists. Could the results of Moutoussis and Zeki be taken to mean that unconscious phenomenal character of a perceptual state is weaker/less pronounced then the conscious phenomenal character? If we opt for an affirmative answer, the thesis of unconscious phenomenality will need to be modified accordingly. We will have to say that the unconscious phenomenality is in fact only a "proto-phenomenality", a less vivid version of the full-blown conscious phenomenality. We do not want to reject this proposal outright. In fact, it could even help to explain the uncertainty and degraded precision typical of recognition tasks during unconscious perception. However, there is an alternative explanation of the etiolated signal during unconscious face perception: the stronger signal during conscious perception of a face is entirely due to the neural mechanisms of consciousness, not of phenomenality. This explanation allows one to defend the thesis that unconscious and conscious phenomenal character are the same.
A more pressing issue for the dual model of phenomenal consciousness is constituted by certain perceptual masking experiments. Subliminal perceptual priming and forced-choice discrimination work when the shapes of letters of the alphabet, faces, flames consuming the house, orientation of gratings, etc. are unconsciously perceived (He, Cavanagh, & Intriligator, 1996; Prinz, 2015; Weiskrantz, 1986) . Phenomenal shapes of various kinds thus can be argued to exist unconsciously. However, some experiments suggest that some phenomenal qualities do not exist during unconscious perception. For example, colours pose a challenge for the dual model.
The level to which the visual information is processed without consciousness was studied by Breitmeyer, Ro, and Singhal (2004) . They describe a priming experiment involving white and desaturated blue and green stimuli. The subjects were first shown a white disk for such a short time interval that they could not see the disk consciously (14.3 ms). The white disk served as a prime. Then a blank screen was presented (28.6 ms), followed by a mask consisting of desaturated green annulus surrounding the area formerly occupied by the white disk (28.6 ms). The subjects were then asked, in 2 AFC task, whether the annulus was blue or green. The answers were then compared to the similar situation in which white prime disk was followed by a blank screen which was followed by a desaturated blue annulus of the same position and size as the green one. It was found that the priming effect of the unseen white disk depends on the colour of the annulus. When the annulus was green, the white prime raised the choice in favour of the green annulus. On the contrary, when the annulus was blue, the white disk did not serve as an effective prime for preferring the blue annulus. Thus the white prime disk somehow facilitates the choice of the green colour; it acts more like a green prime than a blue prime.
However, when in a variant of the experiment the white prime disks were consciously visible, they acted more like blue primes than green ones. What accounts for such a striking difference in discriminatory reactions? Breitmeyer and colleagues propose to distinguish between stimulus-level priming and perceptual-level priming. They speculate that the visual stimulus-level priming acts solely on the physical information regarding the wavelength properties of the stimulus. Photometric measurements of the display used in their lab revealed that the wavelength composition of desaturated green phosphors was more similar to the wavelength composition of the white prime disk than the wavelength of the blue desaturated screen phosphors. Perceptual-level priming, on the other hand, targets the phenomenal colour properties of the stimuli. Phenomenally, desaturated blue annulus is more similar to the white disk than desaturated green annulus. Our opponent may, then, argue that what is registered unconsciously by the visual system is not the phenomenal colour (blue, green), but rather just the wavelength properties of the reflecting surfaces of the stimuli. The results and reasoning of Breitmeyer et al. leads Lamme (2015) to conclude that the transition from wavelength analysis to the perception of colour marks the transition from unconscious neural processing to conscious vision. If this account is correct, the dual model of phenomenal consciousness will not work for phenomenal colours -a rather significant loss.
If this objection to the dual model of consciousness is correct, we would need to distinguish between those phenomenal qualities that can occur unconsciously (such as shapes) and those that cannot (such as colours). But it would be premature to conclude that there cannot be unconscious colours. In fact, the issue is far from settled. In contrast to the Breitmeyer experiments, an experiment of Boyer, Harrison, and Ro (2005) revealed that in a temporary TMS-induced blindsight in healthy subjects, discrimination of colour identity (not just of wavelength) is possible at above chance levels without awareness of the colour. Furthermore, Ro et al. (2009) similarly report that colour, not just wavelength information, is processed in the absence of conscious awareness. In a metacontrast priming experiment, they found that unconsciously seen colour of a disk speeds up response times of colour discrimination of the congruently coloured masking annulus. Railo, Salminen-Vaparanta, Henriksson, Revonsuo, and Koivisto (2012) performed a TMS study in which forced-choice unconscious discrimination of colours was above chance when participants reported consciously perceiving some stimulus features, but not its color. Finally, Norman, Akins, Heywood, and Kentridge (2014), using a metacontrast masking paradigm similar to Breitmeyer et al. (2004) , demonstrated successful priming by unseen stimuli when the prime and the mask shared surface colour, but they didn't find a corresponding priming effect in terms of reflected colour (i.e., in terms of wavelength properties). All this evidence points to the existence of unconscious visual processing of colours.
Note also that the timing of the stimulus presentation in the experiments is of paramount importance. The time frame of the white disk appearance in the Breitmeyer et al. experiments (14. 3 ms) is simply too small for an unconscious phenomenal colour to be fully formed: it takes between 60 and 100 ms for a signal to travel to V4 and other areas in the inferotemporal cortex where colours are processed (Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, Ungerleider, & Mishkin, 2013) . Given this, it is not surprising that the priming with white disks in the Breitmeyer et al. design cannot utilize the phenomenal aspects of colour. On the other hand, if the time for processing colour is sufficiently long, such as in the , or in continuous flash suppression (up to many seconds), we can presumably get fully fledged but unconscious phenomenal colours. If this line of thinking is sound, the thesis of unconscious phenomenality is defensible even for colours, not just for shapes.
In summary, we are prepared to revise the thesis of unconscious phenomenality ("All phenomenal qualities can occur without consciousness") to allow for phenomenal qualities that cannot occur without consciousness, providing empirical evidence suggests this is desirable. The evidence available so far points rather towards the version of the dual model of phenomenal consciousness according to which all phenomenal qualities can occur without consciousness.
Cognitive neuroscience
On unitary models of phenomenal consciousness, both the formation of phenomenal character and the awareness of it are secured by a single neural process. As we observed, this picture is based entirely on stubborn intuitions: nothing in the empirical data of neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience or experimental psychology provides any support to the unitary approach. On the contrary, the available evidence favours the dual approach. In particular, the neuroscientific evidence points to the need of separating the neural mechanisms creating the phenomenal qualities and the mechanisms that make these qualities conscious. The argument of the preceding section can thus be complemented by this further evidence.
The dual model neatly dovetails with one of the most discussed theories of conscious visual perception in cognitive neuroscience, the one put forward by Victor Lamme. The theory enables the separation of brain mechanisms creating the phenomenal character of a mental state from the mechanisms making it conscious by decomposing the formation of a conscious visual state into two parts. The first is a process of fast feedforward sweep, a one-way activation of all the areas in the visual system of the brain, which usually takes less than 80 ms (although the areas are not reached strictly chronologically according to their place in functional hierarchy; e.g., the area MT is reached around 15 ms before the area V2). The second process consists of recurrent neural activity. During this phase of perception, higher visual centres send the signal back to the lower ones. This feedback activity occurs about 100 ms after stimulus onset. These recurrent loops, supported by strong synchronous activity in the theta, beta, and gamma bands, make the visual percept conscious (Lamme, 2006 (Lamme, , 2010 (Lamme, , 2015 .
The pivotal argument for linking consciousness and recurrent neural activity is that disrupting top-down feedback input to V1 from higher regions impairs visual awareness (see Boehler, Schoenfeld, Heinze, & Hopf, 2008; Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001 ). Importantly, even without recurrent neural activity the visual information may be processed fairly comprehensively: for example, the neural activation typical for human face perception in the fusiform area can be observed in the fMRI scanner even when the perception is not conscious. We propose that the fast feedforward sweep could be the neural mechanism producing unconscious visual phenomenal qualities. The subsequent recurrent activity in the visual system then makes these qualities conscious.
Lamme's theory thus provides the neural underpinning for the dual model of phenomenal consciousness. Lamme himself would not agree with our interpretation of his theory as a specimen of the dual model of phenomenal consciousness. In Lamme (2015) he subscribes to the orthodox view that conscious perceptual processes have phenomenal character whereas unconscious ones don't. Despite this fact, we believe that his account is more compatible with the dual approach. Feedforward activation of the structures in the visual system sets up the phenomenal character of perceptual states, while recurrent neural loops make this phenomenal character conscious. These two processes are obviously different in regards to both the neural mechanisms involved and as to their time profiles -the production of phenomenal qualities precedes their entry into consciousness by tens of milliseconds, which is a very robust distinction from the neural point of view. Now, Lamme's theory, which we use to support the dual model of phenomenal consciousness, has been criticized. For example, Tsuchiya and van Boxtel (2010) suggest that recurrent processing is not necessary for consciousness. They argue (for other criticisms see the commentaries in Lamme, 2010) that gist perception of an unfamiliar and unexpected visual scene seems to be possible before recurrence could even start, i.e., in a purely feedforward manner (see also ffytche & Zeki, 2011) . By the same token, they hold that recurrent processing seems to be insufficient for consciousness, as experiments on perceptual suppression indicate. These are, of course, important criticisms. If they prove correct, we can continue defending the view that unconscious phenomenal qualities are generated by feedforward neural processes while letting the nature of neural processes making these qualities conscious be elucidated by further empirical research. In other words, the dual model of phenomenal consciousness itself is independent of the particulars of Lamme's theory of conscious vision. We are using this theory as a vivid illustration of a neuroscientific account, which is both well supported by currently available evidence, and at the same time fully compatible with the dual model of consciousness.
However, there are other models in cognitive neuroscience sustaining the same idea. The popular Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness (Dehaene, 2014 ) is a case in point. The theory explains conscious perception as an entry of sensory information into a network of brain nodes and regions (in parietal, temporal and prefrontal cortex) via long axonal projections (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) . Although this is (probably) not how its authors conceive of it, the sensory information might be of a phenomenal nature, not just a non-phenomenal, non-qualitative signal. This unconscious phenomenal information is then made conscious by its entry into the Global Workspace (GW). The distinction between phenomenal-character-producing and consciousness-conferring neural processes, typical for the dual model of phenomenal consciousness, is preserved in this interpretation of the GW theory.
Suppose now that we interpret the GW theory in the standard unitary fashion. The ascent to the global workspace simultaneously makes a mental state conscious and creates its phenomenal character. The problem with this picture is that the qualitative transformation of content entering the global workspace is left unexplained by the theory. The core of the GW theory of consciousness is simply that a content is made available for report and action by entering the global workspace and that this is what makes the content conscious. Notice how the problem of explaining the qualitative transformation disappears when we take the GW theory to be an instance of the dual model of consciousness. Phenomenal character of a state is generated in dedicated brain areas (visual, auditory, etc.) , and the ascent to the global workspace is the mechanism that makes all perceptual contents conscious.
Other hypotheses that seem to be coherent with the dual model include those based on the distinction between specific and nonspecific brain systems. Roughly, the specific systems are responsible for establishing the content to be experienced, while the nonspecific systems allow this content to become conscious by modifying the content-related activity. An early example of this approach is Llinás, Ribary, Contreras, and Pedroarena (1998) . The authors postulate that a conscious mental state is the result of coordinated activation of specific and non-specific thalamocortical circuits. A more recent theory develops a similar idea, focusing especially on the integration of content-determining mechanisms and mechanisms regulating the level of consciousness. Bachmann and Hudetz (2014) suggest that consciousness in general, and perceptual conscious state in particular emerges as a result of interaction between the following two systems. The first (called D) is a bottom-up, specific content-determining data system which gets the data from the senses and provides the perceived content. The second (called L) is a non-specific neuromodulatory system sending intracortical topdown associative signals by which the level of consciousness is regulated.
10 Supporting this line of thinking, recent neurophysiological evidence highlights the capacity of pyramidal neurons, in layer 5 of the neocortex, to integrate two kinds of inputs. With considerable simplification we can say that the first kind of input consists of feedforward signals to the basal dendrites of pyramidal cells and its function is to fix the perceptual content. The second, modulatory mechanism then influences whether this content will be experienced consciously. This latter mechanism is called apical amplification, for it is implemented in the apical synapses of mature pyramidal cells (Phillips, Larkum, Harley, & Silverstein, 2016) . 11 All this new neurobiological evidence may provide further support to the dual model of consciousness because it enables to disentangle the processes responsible for preparing the perceptual content (i.e., the phenomenal character) from those regulating the conscious experience of this content. This subchapter offers the basics of a neural explanation of consciousness. But, one might ask, what is that a theory of? We accept the view that consciousness is always consciousness of this or that set of phenomenal qualities and we disavow the possibility of "pure consciousness", postulated by some mystics and meditators, completely and utterly devoid of all phenomenal aspects. In other words, a theory of consciousness, by our lights, is a theory of how the independently constituted phenomenal qualities become conscious for the subject. So, even on the dual model, consciousness is tied with phenomenal qualities. Consciousness has to bite its teeth into something, so to speak, and this will be some phenomenal qualities. However, and this is crucial, we want to block the inference that the phenomenal qualities are so inextricably bound with consciousness that they cannot exist without it. By not making this inference, we enable the divorce of consciousness and phenomenality even on the standard Nagelian picture of consciousness as whatit's-like-ness. What-it's-like-ness only occurs at the conscious level, for to be in a completely unconscious mental state does not feel like anything. But phenomenality, we argue, is broader than what-it's-like-ness, however deeply entrenched may be the identification of the two in the current philosophy of mind. To sum up, we can speak of the one-way dependence of consciousness and phenomenal qualities: consciousness depends on qualities for its existence, whereas qualities can exist independently of consciousness.
Conclusions
The consensus, quite rare in philosophy and neuroscience, is that there are no phenomenal qualities outside of consciousness, and moreover that phenomenality equals experiential what-it's-like-ness. Our view is that a mental state may be complete in terms of its neurophysiological as well as phenomenal properties, not just in its conscious form but also in its unconscious form. The dual model of phenomenal consciousness, which we advocated in this paper, thus requires that the mechanisms producing phenomenal qualities and the mechanisms making these qualities conscious be treated as separate.
We have argued for the dual model in light of four distinct arguments. The conceptual argument claims that the notion of an unconscious phenomenal quality is plausible, despite some stubborn intuitions. The conceptual argument paves the way for the methodological argument, which consists in the claim that empirical research must treat consciousness of a mental state as a variable. The presence or absence of consciousness is then the sole distinguishing criterion of otherwise identical states. The neuropsychological argument adds to this the idea that observed reactions of patients with neuropsychological disorders are guided by already formed but not consciously registered phenomenal qualities. It is an inference to the best explanation: the existence of unconscious phenomenal states best accounts for the behaviour of subjects observed in psychological experiments. In neglect and blindsight, only the mechanisms of consciousness itself are defunct. The mechanisms for the production of phenomenal character might still be intact. Finally, the argument from cognitive neuroscience draws attention to the fact that the dual model of phenomenal consciousness is fully compatible with some of the most prominent theories of consciousness put forward by cognitive neuroscientists. These theories provide a possible neural underpinning for the dual model, making it more empirically respectable.
Together, these arguments make a very strong case for the dual model of consciousness. Compared to that, the arguments for the currently dominant unitary model seem to be less persuasive. For instance, how are the discriminatory reactions of neuropsychological patients to be explained by the unitary model? Defenders of the unitary model could say that neuronal activity completely devoid of phenomenality may still account for the above-noted behaviours of neglect and blindsight subjects. When the subject indicates, e.g., that she would not live in the house consumed by flames, she does not harbour any unconscious phenomenal snapshot of the flames. The behaviour is completely automated, reflex-like; it's a neural push and pull between visual and speech centres. Unconscious perception is nothing over and above transduction of information via sensory channels in the brain. No phenomenality, just neurons firing in the dark. Although we cannot prove beyond all doubt that the discriminations could not be performed without unconsciously registered phenomenal qualities, we believe that the just-neurons-firing-in-the-dark story is not very appealing. It is unclear whether it really explains anything. In contrast, the dual model provides a parsimonious explanation of how unconscious discrimination and recognition is performed: it is performed by means of the same phenomenal perceptual qualities as appear at the conscious level. The work in cognitive neuroscience supporting our dual approach (Section 3.2) then enhances plausibility of the dual model by suggesting that the phenomenal character of a conscious mental state is identical to the phenomenal character of its unconscious counterpart. These phenomenal characters are the same in its conscious and unconscious form because they are created by the same neural mechanism. 13 Similarly, the methodological desideratum that consciousness is to be treated as an experimental variable is also not satisfied by the unitary model of phenomenal consciousness. According to this model, conscious mental states possess phenomenality while unconscious mental states lack it completely. The two types of states thus differ more substantively than is permitted by the desideratum. The dual model, on the other hand, does justice to this maxim of empirical research, for it claims that conscious and unconscious states differ only in the presence of consciousness. It could be objected, though, that the dual model doesn't satisfy another methodological principle, that of double dissociation. The dual model allows phenomenal qualities without consciousness, but is silent about the reverse possibility of consciousness without phenomenal qualities.
14 This objection is valid. As we already stated above, consciousness must be consciousness of something, of this or that phenomenal quality. Double dissociation of consciousness and phenomenal quality is therefore impossible, for there cannot be consciousness without phenomenal qualities. In this respect, then, our model of consciousness is methodologically sub-optimal. However, the requirement that the phenomenon under study be treated as a variable is scientifically more important, and the dual proposal accommodates it fully. The disadvantage of the unitary model of phenomenal consciousness is that it makes phenomenal consciousness intractable. What truly magical brain process can produce a phenomenal quality and turn the spotlight of consciousness upon it at the same time? Distinguishing the mechanisms for phenomenal qualities and for consciousness along the lines of the dual model looks like a more feasible project than the attempt to explain them en bloc -an attempt those who prefer the unitary model are bound to undertake. One can also think about a hybrid unitarian theory, according to which we can theoretically separate consciousness from perceptual qualities, but in reality they always co-occur. We see three disadvantages of this view. First, one needs to secure that both processesconsciousness and the production of qualities -always and in all circumstances co-occur together. But it is unclear how to secure this. Second, we cannot find any empirical support for the claim of co-occurrence of consciousness and perceptual quality. The dual model we favour, in contrast, has some support in current cognitive neuroscience. Lamme's theory of neural recurrence does separate the two processes in time and space. Third, it is not clear what mechanisms can account for unconscious perception (provided one accepts its existence) on the hybrid view. If the phenomenal qualities-mechanism can only operate when consciousness is present, unconscious perception must recruit a different set of mechanisms than those enabling conscious perception (which trades in phenomenal information). What are these mechanisms and why are they not recruited in cases of conscious perception? The hybrid proposal leaves this unexplained. The dual model of phenomenal consciousness is free of these perplexities. But it is not just an attractive theoretical option. It suggests a way forward for the empirical research on consciousness as well. This research could be split into the search for the mechanisms producing phenomenal character of a mental state, and an inquiry into what makes such state conscious. 15 
